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The Immanent Potential of Economic and
Monetary Integration: A Critical Reading
of the Eurozone Crisis
Peter J. Verovsˇek
The Eurozone crisis revealed fundamental ﬂaws in the institutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. Its lack of
political steering capacity has demonstrated the need for a broad but seemingly unachievable political union with shared
economic governance and a common treasury. Agreement on further measures has been difﬁcult to achieve, as different actors
have imposed divergent external criteria for the success of the Eurozone. As part of their heritage in Western Marxism, the critical
theorists of the Frankfurt School sought to overcome such problems by identifying internal standards for social criticism. Building
on their understanding of immanent critique, I argue that the Eurozone already contains the normative principles necessary to
support greater political integration. While the citizens of Europe must provide the democratic legitimation necessary to realize
this latent potential, the ﬂaws revealed by the crisis are already pushing Europe towards greater transnational solidarity.
S tarting in the fall of 2007 the world experiencedthe greatest economic downturn since the GreatDepression. The so-called Great Recession began
as a subprime mortgage crash in the United States,
leading to the collapse of global ﬁnancialized capitalism.
By 2010 the contagion had shifted across two dimen-
sions: what had started in the American private sector had
moved across the Atlantic and into the public domain.1
The result was a monetary, banking, and sovereign debt
crisis among the member-states of the European Union
(EU) that share its common currency, the euro.
Responsibility for the crisis of the Eurozone can be
divided into three parts. Actors in the northern core,
whose investors ﬁnanced irresponsible borrowing and
whose leaders sought to protect these interests, as well as
in the southern periphery, which took advantage of low
interest rates to bankroll unwise investments, share the
blame for the proliferation of bad loans. The fact that this
behavior took place within the faulty architecture of the
Maastricht Treaty (1992), which created the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) as a currency without
a treasury and a common market without shared eco-
nomic governance, turned these actions into a global
crisis.2
On a structural level, the inability of the southern
states to devaluate a currency outside their control
confronted them with the risk of sovereign default. In
response to attacks by globalized ﬁnancial markets, crisis-
ridden governments were forced to adopt austerity to
regain their competitiveness while facing ever-higher
interest rates on their bonds. Successive infusions of
capital—ﬁnanced in part by taxpayers from the north—
sought to lower interest premiums on southern bonds
while protecting the investments of northern banks.
However, this policy merely converted private liabilities
into public debt.3
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The “ﬂaws in the construction of the single currency”—
combined with the international dynamics of ﬁnancialized
“casino capitalism”—brought on what Claus Offe calls “a
crisis of crisis management.”4 Instead of working together
to address shared problems, “each country [has defended]
its own interests while attempting to beneﬁt from ‘free-
rider’ tactics.”5 Because policy repertoires have been
recycled without addressing the underlying causes of the
crisis, the citizens of the Eurozone trust neither national
governments nor European authorities to address the
problems of the euro.
The Eurozone crisis has also had a signiﬁcant impact
on the functioning of the EU. It has raised the proﬁle
of heads of governments and national parliaments,
“highlighting the importance of domestic politics as
a constraint to the creation of joint supranational transfer
mechanisms.” By questioning the “permissive consensus”
supporting integration and reinforcing its intergovern-
mental aspects, these events have threatened the EU as “an
ongoing experiment with new forms of governance outside
the nation-state.”6
The increasing demand for ﬁscal transfers and the
conditionality linking bailouts to reforms in domestic
welfare policies has reinvigorated debates about Europe’s
democratic deﬁcit.7 Recent events have revived traditional
forms of Euroscepticism. They have also given rise to
a new generation of what I call “euro-skeptics” seeking to
repatriate control over monetary policy.8 Unlike those
who oppose integration based on emotion or ideology,
opponents of the common currency contend that support
for the EMU “should not derive from any theoretical or
normative belief . . . but must be assessed on the basis of
practical cost/gains analysis.” These critics do not oppose
the euro or the EU as such, but rather “the ‘dogma’ of an
ever closer union.”9
In contrast to traditional Eurosceptics, who tend to
draw on conservative and nationalistic principles, these
new “euro-skeptics” hail from both the right and the left.
Many of these empirical detractors of euro are political
economists, who point to the fact that the EMU is not an
optimum currency area. They argue that the Eurozone
cannot beneﬁt from a common monetary policy because it
lacks both a political union with ﬁscal transfers and
sufﬁcient labor mobility to smooth out the differences in
economic performance between the member-states.10
Commenting on these events, Jürgen Habermas
observes that the EU is “trapped in the dilemma between,
on the one side, the economic policies required to preserve
the Euro and, on the other, the political steps to closer
integration.” Similarly, Offe notes that “the mismatch
between what is economically necessary and what is
politically feasible can be seen on both sides of Europe’s
north-south divide.”11 The crisis of the Eurozone thus
presents the peoples of the continent with a choice: either
dismantle the EMU by repatriating monetary policy to the
member-states, or “signiﬁcantly increas[e] the degree of
political union” through “greater centralization and polit-
ical uniﬁcation.”12
Using the approach to immanent critique developed
by the Frankfurt School, I argue for the latter course of
action. In order to overcome the resistance individuals
feel to values that are imposed from the outside, the
thinkers associated with the Institute for Social Research
(Institut für Sozialforschung) developed a form of analysis
that “immanently criticize[s] a given social order in terms
of how adequately it measures up to the standards . . . it
presupposes.” These critical theorists argue that when
existing socio-political structures cease to function
smoothly—as they have in the crisis of the Eurozone—
the object of critique identiﬁes itself as a social pathology.
In the words of Theodor Adorno, “Immanent criticism is
never solely purely logical but always concrete as well—the
confrontation of concept and reality.”13
I build on this approach to argue that further
integration towards a banking and a ﬁscal union can
help realize the underlying principles of the EMU. The
euro was designed to limit the inﬂuence of a reuniﬁed
Germany by replacing the continent’s dominant
currency and central back—the Deutschmark and
Bundesbank—with equivalents under joint European
control. The EMU has failed spectacularly in fulﬁlling
this normative objective, as the common currency
regime has catapulted the Federal Republic “into the
position of the undisputed great power in Europe as
a whole.”14
Drawing on the method of immanent critique, the
Frankfurt School developed a two-step approach to
critical theory that starts with a “crisis diagnosis” followed
by “anticipatory-utopian” reﬂection on how social actors
can emancipate themselves from the pathologies of the
present.15 Using this approach, I argue that the peoples of
Europe must further their “experiment with new forms of
governance outside the nation-state” in order to effectively
confront powerful international markets that have been
able to dictate policy to sovereign states by demanding
ever-larger interest rates on government bonds. In order to
do so the citizens of the EU will have to reassert their
democratic authority vis-à-vis supranational and national
elites, as well as international economic actors.16
The argument starts by reﬂecting on the use of
political theory as a way of analyzing contemporary
developments. I then present a genealogy of immanent
critique, showing how the thinkers of the Frankfurt
School adapt this method to create a distinctive form of
theoretical analysis. In this system, a critical “diagnosis
of the times” (Zeitdiagnose) is followed by reﬂection on
the social action necessary to overcome the problems
identiﬁed.17
The rest of the argument follows this two-step schema.
In the third section, I therefore deploy immanent critique
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in its “explanatory-diagnostic” function. I engage in
categorical critique to show how the problems of the
Eurozone have pushed Europe towards a de facto political
union in order to resolve the “contradiction[s] at the heart
of the present.”18 In addition to undermining the very
concept of a common currency area, I also use normative
critique to show that that the EMU has failed to fulﬁll its
broader social goal of democratizing German power over
its neighbors.
The gradual narrowing of the distance between the
economically necessary and the politically possible has left
Europeans in what G.W.F. Hegel calls “a state of
unthinking inertia.” As a method of exposing internal
contradictions in social praxis, immanent critique does not
imply that social change is imminent. Instead, it provides
the groundwork for combatting this complacency with
“critical participation and appropriate action.”19 In part
four I therefore shift to the “anticipatory-utopian” stage of
critique, arguing that Europe needs to create stronger
institutions under the democratic control of the European
public to fulﬁll the full potential of the EU as a postnational
form of politics.20 I conclude by reﬂecting on the dangers
of relying too heavily on economic integration.
Political Theory, Integration, and “Real” Politics
It may seem strange or counterintuitive to use political
theory to address issues that are usually discussed using
economic terms. However, the crisis of the Eurozone
touches on many of the most important theoretical
questions in political science, including the relationship
between politics and economics, the dynamics of demo-
cratic politics, the distribution of power within society
and the decline of sovereignty in an age of globalization.
The basic choice between further integration and retreat
—though often framed in economic terms—is eminently
political.
In addressing a political crisis by deploying the method
of immanent critique, my argument is part of a broader
move towards “problem-driven research” in political
theory. The subﬁeld’s traditional focus on the timeless
questions of politics and its reluctance to address “ques-
tions of method and approach” have gradually given way
to an interest in methodology and the connection between
political developments and normative theory.21 These
trends have coalesced around the movement known as
political realism, which seeks to “mak[e] a constructive
contribution to politics.”22
Political realists and other theorists pursuing problem-
driven research have sought to take the “circumstances of
politics” into account by focusing on institutions as the
primary site of political action.23 Although I share many of
the goals of political realism, my analysis builds on the
politically-engaged, problem-driven work of the Frankfurt
School. The thinkers associated with this tradition draw on
immanent critique to develop an approach to social
criticism that proceeds from crisis diagnosis to practical
reﬂections on the changes that are needed to create more
emancipated forms of life.
Studies of the EU are particularly good examples of
“the need for bridging empirical and normative analysis.”
In addition to critical theory’s two-stage approach, there
are many other ways to analyze the euro-crisis from
a theoretical perspective.24 For example, Alessandro Fer-
rara has adopted an approach based on John Rawls’s
conception of public reason to show that the debates over
the failed Constitutional Treaty displayed a nascent Euro-
pean identity capable of supporting further integration.25
In a similar vein, Glyn Morgan has identiﬁed joint
security as a legitimate justiﬁcation for the EU. Such lines
of inquiry have been spurred by the publication of an
exchange of letters between Rawls, who takes a traditionally
Eurosceptical position, and Philipp Van Parijs over whether
the EU qualiﬁes as a “realistic utopia.” Unfortunately, as
Beate Sissenich points out, such Rawlsian approaches tend
to “assum[e] away difference instead of engaging it.”26
Pierre Manent, a noted skeptic of integration, criticizes
the EU based on his reading of the history of political
thought. Surveying the philosophical literature, Manent
claims that there are only three stable forms of political
community: the self-sufﬁcient city, the sovereign state,
and the universalistic empire. He sees the EU as a mixed
polity forever caught between state and empire, between
claims to sovereignty and aspirations to universalism.27
Manent connects this conclusion to the contemporary
crisis by arguing that Europe is experiencing a crisis of
governance. He contends that a deﬁnitionally unstable
polity like the EU can function neither as a sovereign
government nor as an imperial metropolis. As a result, it
ends up with “rules elaborated by an indeﬁnite number of
bodies and agencies responsible to no one.” As part of the
crisis these technocratic bodies, which pride themselves on
“their expertise and ‘competence,’” have become “rightly
discredited” along with the “idea of governance” beyond
the state. For Manent, solution is clear: “The illusions of
‘governance’ gone, government returns to its place” with
the nation-state once again taking priority over suprana-
tional organizations.28
In addition to Manent, one of the most forceful
proponents of a return to the nation-state is Wolfgang
Streeck, who proceeds from a sociological perspective that
crosses the empirical/theoretical divide. In contrast to
categories provided by Manent’s intellectual history,
Streeck looks back to the lessons of the Wirtschaftswunder
(“economic miracle”) and the trente glorieuses (“glorious
thirty”) spanning the period from 1945 to 1975. This
examination of Europe’s golden age leads Streeck to
conclude that monetary policy must given back to the
nation-states that enabled Europe’s postwar prosperity in
the ﬁrst place.29
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Streeck is a particularly interesting foil for my argu-
ment given his background in critical theory and his
surprisingly rancorous public debate with Habermas.
While Streeck and Habermas agree on their basic
diagnosis of the problems of the euro, they disagree
about whether this requires pulling back or pushing
forward with integration.30 Their approaches to this
problem are also at odds. Whereas Habermas proceeds
from an immanent critique of the present, Streeck argues
for a return to the successful practices of the past.
My argument follows Habermas, both in style and
substance. Compared with Streeck’s historical analysis
and other external approaches to the “normative turn” in
European Union Studies, immanent critique has two
distinct advantages.31 First, by evaluating social structures
against their own standards, it avoids accusations that the
criteria of judgment are “partial, reﬂecting the history and
tradition of a particular society or group.” Second, by
demonstrating to social actors that they are not living up to
their own ideals, it is more likely to provide them “with
some degree of motivation to follow [their own values] and
to sanction compliance.”32
Streeck’s position assumes that it is still possible to
return to the practices of the postwar economic boom,
where the nation-state was able to use its sovereign powers
to exercise control over global market forces. However,
there is much empirical evidence tracing the decline of
sovereign power. Over the course of the twentieth century
“the nation state has rapidly become an unnatural, even
dysfunctional, unit . . . [with neither] the tools nor the
political base to play an effective role.”33 As a result,
“the pattern of inﬂuence and decision-making that rules
the world has an increasingly marginal connection with
sovereignty.”34
This “multifaceted erosion of sovereignty is a momen-
tous change,” which has led to the search for new
concepts to describe the decision-making capacity pre-
viously associated with this term.35 Whereas political
theorists increasingly think in terms of “legalization,”
international lawyers have turned to “fragmentation” and
“constutionalization” to capture this transformation.36
Even when it is used, sovereignty has been redeﬁned in
functionalist terms. Instead of describing the Weberian
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within
a given territory,” sovereignty now often refers to the
state’s obligation to “preserve life-sustaining standards for
its citizens.”37
These changes “simply leav[e] no room for any valid
notion of the state.” This trend is most pronounced in
Europe. The creation of the EU as a supranational entity
with independent decision-making powers that lie outside
the constitutional infrastructure of the member-states has
rendered the continental “nation-state hollow and its
institutions meaningless.”38 As a result, it is difﬁcult to
see the European state as the solution for reasserting the
power of democratic popular sovereignty vis-à-vis inter-
national markets and globalized ﬁnancial capital.39
In the next section, I detail the Frankfurt School’s
approach to immanent critique. I then apply this method
to the crisis of the Eurozone. In contrast to Streeck, I argue
that the only way to reassert the democratic power of the
European peoples is to extend integration beyond the
nation-state.
Critiquing from Within
Social criticism can be based on at least three distinct
approaches: the normative discovery of objective standards,
the constructivist invention of criteria or the hermeneutic
interpretation of already accepted norms. Immanent
critique crosses the boundaries of the latter two categories.
As a form of reconstructive argument, it seeks to discover
criteria for criticism through a constructivist interpretation
of the internal norms of a social practice. The critic is thus
“engaged in a form of critique that aims to employ
normative potentials . . . [that] transcend the agreed-upon
norms of a society, but are, in some way or another,
nevertheless already ‘immanent’ in social reality.”40
The critical theory developed by the Frankfurt School
starts from the conviction that “apolitical reﬂections on
praxis are unconvincing.” Despite their differences,
thinkers such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer,
and Herbert Marcuse agree that a critical social and
political theory must maintain a commitment to what
Habermas calls the “embedding of theoretical accomplish-
ments in the practical contexts of their genesis and
employment.”41 This persuasion led the Frankfurt Circle
to adopt immanent critique as a central pillar of their
interdisciplinary research program.
Internal criticism has a rich genealogy. Although it has
its origins in ancient Greece, where Socrates sought to
show his fellow Athenians that their ideas were internally
incoherent, it gained renewed salience in the aftermath of
the French Revolution, “when situation-transcendent
ideas for the ﬁrst time became forces [capable of]
spearheading the transformation of the existing state of
society.”42 Most importantly, Immanuel Kant drew on
immanent critique in order to redirect “the liberal notions
of freedom and equality which had emerged in response to
the growth of state power against political domination and
inter-state violence.”43
A generation later, Hegel modiﬁed Kant’s “critical
philosophy,” arguing that social reality becomes “imma-
nently rational” when universal moral rules are actualized
within concrete institutions. For Hegel, immanent cri-
tique ensured the relevance of theoretical reﬂection for the
present:
The refutation must not come from the outside, that is, it must
not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system in
question and inconsistent with it . . . . The genuine refutation
must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his
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own ground; no advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere
and defeating him where he is not.44
Building on Hegel, Karl Marx gave this form of
critique a materialistic dimension by focusing on political
economy and the contradictions in existing relations of
production: “Remaining true to Hegel’s method of
immanent critique, Marx . . . maintains that the historical
process will generate its own critical standards.” He also
turned immanent critique into a method of social change.
Seyla Benhabib points out that for Marx, “the function of
critique is not therapy and healing the wounds of the
ethical as in Hegel’s case, but ‘crisis diagnosis’ enabling and
encouraging future social transformation.”45 This move
gives immanent critique its practical bite.
The thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School
inherited the praxis-oriented form of social criticism
found in Marx’s early writings, which “delimits the ﬁeld
of radical social criticism and change, and at the same time
posits criteria both for rationality of criticism and de-
sirability of change, without reference to anything tran-
scendent to history.” Given the value pluralism brought
about by the onset of modernity and industrialization, the
Frankfurt Circle seeks to “circumvent a skeptical spurning
of value judgments without succumbing to normative
dogmatism.”Horkheimer argues that this can be achieved
“by relating social institutions and activities to the values they
themselves set forth as their own standards and ideals.”46
Unlike other modes of social criticism, which are based
on external normative perspectives, immanent critique is
rooted in social praxis: “On the one hand, critical theory
and the critical theorist are rooted in, emerge out of, and
are shaped by existing social reality; on the other hand, the
critical theorist cannot accept existing social reality as it is
but must instead critique and even condemn it.”47 Instead
of seeking an objective Archimedean point, the critic
locates the transcendent within the immanent. Critical
theory focuses on the pathologies of the present by
recognizing that the “development of society itself gives
rise to a problem situation objectively affording contempo-
raries privileged access to the structures of the social
world.”48 The Frankfurt School argues that the internal
contradictions of the present are expressed not only
through economic dysfunction, but also as “lived crises”
experienced by concrete individuals.49
As part of the broader movement known as Western
Marxism, the ﬁrst generation of the Frankfurt School
interprets Marx as a critical thinker, not as the scientiﬁc
economist whose theories served as the basis for Soviet
(Eastern) Marxism.50 This leads to a methodology that
proceeds in two operational stages, demanding both “the
analysis of the process of social reproduction with reference
to systematic dysfunctions and antinomies, and also with
reference to the dynamic possibility of a radical and
historically progressive social transformation.” Critical
theory therefore moves from an “analytico-theoretical”
moment to a “critical-practical” (Márkus) stage that brings
determinate social forces to “an understanding of their
own situation from the standpoint of their ‘real’ interest
and needs.”51
In the ﬁrst “explanatory-diagnostic” (Benhabib) phase,
the theorist seeks to explain and diagnose the pathologies
of the present. This involves categorical critique showing
how the concepts used to explain the crisis undermine
themselves in practice when they “are measured against
their own objective content.” It also builds on normative
criticism of the practices and norms governing the system
as a whole. Thus, immanent critique is not just an analysis
of the concepts of the social practice in question, but also
an examination of its failure to achieve its broader social
and political objectives, so that “the discrepancy between
ideal and actuality becomes apparent.”
In order to fully engage with the problems of
the present, social criticism must move to a second,
“anticipatory-utopian” phase that “addresses the needs and
demands expressed by social actors in the present,
and interpret[s] their potential to lead toward a better
and more humane society.” In its emancipatory capacity,
critical theory reﬂects on how the pathologies diagnosed
via immanent critique could be resolved through the action
of concrete individuals and movements in the present.52
However, the actual resolution of these problems requires
that “the agents themselves . . . appropriate the interpre-
tations, explanations and criticisms proposed by the
theorist.”53
The rest of my argument applies this approach to the
crisis of the Eurozone. In the next section, I draw on
categorical critique to show the “developmental pressure”
the crisis has exerted on the Eurozone, pushing the
member-states towards the kinds of supranational eco-
nomic and political structures necessary for a functioning
monetary union.54 In addition to examining these in-
ternal, categorical contradictions, I also show how the
EMU has failed to fulﬁll its internal normative goal of
containing German power. In the penultimate section
I proceed to the “anticipatory-utopian” stage of the
argument, showing how the peoples of Europe can act
to resolve the pathologies of the present by reasserting their
popular sovereignty at a supranational level.
The Immanent Potential of the EMU
Conducting an immanent critique of the EMU requires
a brief historical reconstruction of the euro’s effects on
politics and economics within the Eurozone. After the
introduction of the common currency at the turn of the
second millennium the new member-states of Europe’s
east and south took advantage of historically-low interest
rates to make up for funds lost to budgetary consolidation.
The crisis shut off the spigot, exposing large budget deﬁcits
that only grew as the governments of these states were
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forced to step in and cover the losses of large private
enterprises. The result was catastrophic for the states on
the periphery of the Eurozone.
A strategy based on recapitalization and backstopping
might have calmed global ﬁnancial markets if the leaders of
the EU had acted quickly to ensure the stability and
liquidity of their banking systems by making it clear that
the core would not allow the periphery to default on its
debt. However, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
insisted that the guarantee against the default come from
the individual member-states, not the EU as a whole. As
panicked markets sought ever-higher interest rates to
ﬁnance new loans, the crisis-ridden member-states of the
east and south slid deeper and deeper into debt.55 The
crisis only abated when the president of the European
Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, made his institution
into the de facto lender of last resort by declaring that
Frankfurt would do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro.”
Public discourse in the north has focused on the
“irresponsible” spending of the “lazy,” “work-averse”
south. Southern calls for help were seen as an attempt to
steal hard-earned northern money. The fact that German
uses the same word for debt and guilt (Schuld) helped tie
economic debates in the Federal Republic to moral
wrongdoing by building on the linguistic connection
between these two concepts. As David Graeber points
out, “the difference between a ‘debt’ and a mere moral
obligation. . .is simply that a creditor has the means to
specify, numerically, exactly how much the debtor owes.”
By making debt into a matter of “impersonal arithmetic,”
the creditor states were able “to justify things that would
otherwise seem outrageous or obscene” by distancing
themselves from the suffering of people in the crisis-ridden
member-states.56
Southern calls for help were met with legalistic replies
about the “no bailout” clause (art. 125 of the “Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union”). This position
overlooks recent discussions about the possibility of re-
nouncing “odious debt.” It also ignores the fact that the
banks that lent money to the European periphery un-
dertook a certain degree of risk—the same risk that they
use to justify their proﬁts. After all, “if a bank were
guaranteed to get its money back, plus interest, no matter
what it did, the whole system wouldn’t work.”57
Although the northern insistence that southern debts
be repaid in full helped placate voters in the north, it
disregards the structural factors driving the ﬁnancial
collapse. What superﬁcially appears to be a sovereign
debt crisis is actually a currency and banking crisis. As
Streeck points out, “it is not ‘our’ [‘northern’] money but
that of the banks which is at stake, and not solidarity with
the Greeks but with ‘the markets.’”58
While some responsibility for the build up of sovereign
debt lies with proﬂigate elites in the European periphery,
banks in the north ﬁnanced this borrowing with open
eyes. After the onset of the crisis these institutions argued
that they were “too big to fail” to blackmail governments
into repaying bad loans. This set off a vicious cycle
between banks and the member-states, demonstrating
that “sovereign debt markets can easily become a forum
for both debtors and creditors behaving badly.”59
The EU ﬁrst recognized the “imperative to break the
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns,” in a commu-
niqué in June 2012 and repeated it following a European
Council meeting in 2013. Breaking out of this pattern
requires a banking union with increased supervisory
authority, powers of debt resolution to negotiate the
abrogation of liabilities generated by bad loans, and
a deposit guarantee to protect the savings of individual
citizens. However, such steps would have signiﬁcant ﬁscal
and political implications for the member-states.
Historically, successful currency unions have inevitably
turned into political unions backstopped by sovereign
authority. Although repatriating power back to the
member-states is theoretically an option, it is untenable
given that sovereignty has been “hollowed out” over the
course of the twentieth century.60 Resolving the crisis will
therefore involve cross-border ﬁscal support for less
competitive member-states, just as economically stronger
states support weaker ones within the United States. This
ﬁscal solidarity would also help address Germany’s current
accounts surplus, which places “sever pressure” on the
troubled economies of the south in violation of the EMU
rules designed to maintain an internal balance between
imports and exports within the Eurozone.61
The political determination to keep the euro—
summed up in Angela Merkel’s statement that “If the
euro fails, Europe fails”—has not been matched by
a readiness to accept the structural imperatives of a func-
tioning currency area. Despite their protests and the public
discourse blaming the debtors, the internal logic of the
Eurozone and the economic necessities of a functioning
monetary policy have gradually forced northern leaders to
take steps towards banking, ﬁscal, and political union. The
development of the crisis has demonstrated that common
ﬁscal governance, the presence of a lender of last resort,
and cross-border ﬁnancial transfers are non-negotiable,
internally-necessary principles of a monetary union.
This development is hardly surprising. In 2001 the
president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi,
told the Financial Times, “I am sure that the euro will
oblige us to introduce a new set of economic policy
instruments. It is politically impossible to propose that
now. But some day there will be a crisis and new
instruments will be created.”62
Although they have always sought to do the bare
minimum necessary to hold the system together, the
progress of the EMU since 2010 has been astonishing,
especially by the slow-moving standards of the EU. Upon
closer analysis, the “community’s objective practices and
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institutions . . . contain . . . immanent normative potenti-
alities,” a “realizable ‘ought’ which is immanent to the
‘is.”’63 In other words, the crisis has forced the realms of
the politically possible and the economically necessary to
gradually overlap.
The immanent potential of the EMU has acted as
a “force towards opening up, learning and transformation
in the concrete situation.” The general pattern of crisis
management shows that the leaders of the northern
creditor states have repeatedly been required to take up
measures they had previously assured their constituents
that they would never agree to.64 The actions of Chan-
cellor Merkel, dubbed the “master of crossing red lines” by
the inﬂuential German weekly Der Spiegel, is the most
glaring example. This is visible in her repeated violation of
her own promises regarding ﬁscal support for Greece:
First she said Germany would not be sending a cent of aid to
Greece. Then she assured Germans that Europe’s bailout funds
would only be temporary. Finally, she denied that Greece’s ﬁrst
bailout package would soon be followed by a second one. Each
time, she was forced to break her promises, and each time the
amount of money the Germans are committing to support the
euro became larger.65
Despite repeatedly crossing red lines, Merkel has
remained unwilling to do more than the minimum
necessary to solve the problems facing the Eurozone on
any given day. Instead of focusing on the big picture, she
and the other northern states have addressed problems on
an ad hoc basis. David Marsh refers to this phenomenon as
“Merkel’s Law of Permanent Disappointment” because
“the German cave-in is never complete enough to resolve
the euro’s problems or to win more than grudging
acknowledgement from supplicant states pleading poverty.
But it nearly always goes too far for Merkel’s critics in
Germany.”66
The gradual resolution of the structural contradictions
of the EMU is visible in the negotiations for a European-
wide banking union with effective supervisory capacities,
powers of debt resolution, and a deposit guarantee.67
While Germany’s desire to protect its regional
Landesbanken from centralized supervision has slowed
progress on the ﬁrst pillar, the European Council has
reached an agreement allowing the ECB to perform
oversight on Eurozone banks through the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism. This settlement has spurred negotiations
on a Single Resolution Mechanism to complement joint
supervision. Progress on the third pillar has stalled, but the
“master of crossing red lines” may have to give in on this
point also.68
The increased interdependence created by the growing
loans used to ﬁnance sovereign debt and the progress on
common banking regulation is slowly pushing the nation-
states of the Eurozone towards increased ﬁscal cooperation.
Debt mutualization, most likely through Eurobonds issued
on behalf of weaker members, will also probably have to
be part of the equation. Joint bonds would have to be
backstopped by the EU and the credit-worthiness of the
stronger Eurozone member-states. This step would end the
cycle of rising interest rates by allowing all members to
share the same relatively low costs of borrowing.69 Since it
is hard to imagine any member-state agreeing to bear part of
another’s debt without some form of ﬁscal oversight,
a broader political union is on the horizon.
Up to this point, my use of immanent critique to
understand the inner dynamics of the Eurozone crisis has
been categorical, investigating how the practices of the
Eurozone contradict the idea of a functioning currency
union. In line with the “explanatory-diagnostic” phase of
the Frankfurt School’s two-step approach to critical
theory, this analysis must be supplemented by normative
critique. Instead of focusing only on the internal contra-
dictions visible within political economy, this move
focuses on the broader norms governing the social system
as a whole. Whereas categorical critique spotlights the
internal problems generated by the concepts used to
understand economics as a speciﬁc area of social life,
internal normative criticism examines the basic goals of the
practices and institutions in question.
The desire to contain Germany—which Henry
Kissinger describes as “[t]oo big for Europe and too small
for the world”—has a long history. During the postwar
period, the division of Germany between the eastern
Democratic Republic and the western Federal Republic
served as a temporary solution to the “German prob-
lem.”70 However, even in its divided state, the Deutsch-
mark became Europe’s leading currency as a result of
West Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder.
As Germany’s institutional “binding to the West”
(Westbindung) made it less of a military threat to peace,
the “German problem” shifted to the economic sphere.
The member-states of the European Communities—the
institutional forerunner of the EU—experienced inﬂation,
devaluation, and monetary volatility as they struggled to
keep up with the Federal Republic’s efﬁciency and pro-
ductivity.71 Their attempts to tie their monetary policies to
those of the Bundesbank through elaborate exchange rate
mechanisms gave birth to the idea of coopting the German
Central Bank from the inside by replacing the D-Mark
with a shared currency governed by joint institutions.
The opportunity to realize this project came with the
end of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In exchange for
allowing West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to
secure his place in history by reunifying Germany after
45 years of division, French President Mitterrand
demanded “a European currency, with an immediate
agreement in black and white, as a sign of German
attachment to Europe.”72 Tying reuniﬁcation to the
Federal Republic’s agreement to monetary union was
meant to dilute German power. Mitterrand argued that
“without a common currency, we are all of us . . . already
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subordinate to the Germans’ will. . . . The only way of
having the right to speak is to establish a European Central
Bank, where one will take decisions jointly.”73
In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, it is clear that
monetary union has failed to fulﬁll this goal. Instead of
taming German power, the euro has actually increased
the dependence of the other member-states on the
economic decisions of the German hegemon. An in-
stitution originally designed to create equality between
the member-states has actually threatened to create
a permanent bifurcation between the core and the
periphery, between northern creditors and southern
debtors.
Leadership, Democracy, and the
European Public
As a result of the crisis, “monetary union, initially
conceived as a technocratic exercise . . . is now rapidly
transforming the EU into a federal entity.”74 Despite its
increasing internal divisions, Europe may have to brace
itself for another round of institutional deepening. The
key question is whether increased integration will succeed
in pushing democracy up to the European level or whether
it will further alienate the people from a technocratic
institution based on neo-liberal economic principles.
Most theorists have focused on the leaders of Europe as
the actors who could rally the public to actualize
immanent goals “by adopting [them] as a conscious
aim.”75 This is not the most appealing prospect. As the
ﬁrst cohort born after 1945 to take the reins of power, the
leaders in ofﬁce at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century
lack the emotional connection created by memories
of war and suffering shared by their predecessors. In
Habermas’s words, they are “normatively disarmed” (normativ
abgerüstet), “preoccupied with a short-winded approach to the
day-to-day problems.”76
Given the internal imperatives towards union, there
is still hope that the crisis can push European leaders to
adopt the economic measures necessary despite polit-
ical resistance. This is also not necessarily a desirable
outcome. While political leaders might be able to reach
agreement “through the proven neo-functionalist
model, without the participation—and possibly even
against the will—of the populace,” such a development
would further alienate European citizens from the EU.77
Instead of following this path, Europe must generate
greater popular legitimacy as it inserts itself into the
ﬁscal and welfare policies, policy areas typically reserved
for states.
As is often the case in such situations, political
leaders have urged citizens and markets to be realistic
about possible changes to the Eurozone. This kind of
realism can easily slip into fatalism. As part of their
conviction that “no facet of social reality could be
understood . . . as ﬁnal or complete in itself,” critical
theorists have maintained that reason should seek to
change social reality instead of accepting it as a given.78
In order to think about how to confront a despondency
that can block political action even in the face of obvious
contradictions in existing social institutions, I have to
switch to the “anticipatory-utopian” phase of critique,
starting with the “require[ment] that a catalyst and agent
of social transformation be speciﬁed.” This leads me to
repose “the question of Who rules Whom?”79 In modern
societies, the answer to this query usually involves the
identiﬁcation of an ofﬁce, position, or institution. Given
the complex, quasi-federal supranational community
model of the EU, the candidates include the leaders of
the member-states, the European Council, the president of
the European Commission, the president of the European
Council, and the president of the European Parliament.
While this question is difﬁcult in the abstract, “thanks
to its economic might, Germany has been catapulted by
the ﬁnancial crisis and the crisis of the Euro into the
position of the undisputed great power.” Any changes to
structure of the Eurozone must have the support of
Europe’s economic, ﬁnancial and monetary hegemon.
Ulrich Beck illustrates the key role that Germany plays
in the euro-crisis with an example from February 2012,
when Europe was considering the second rescue package
for Greece. In reporting on the decision facing the EU,
a journalist on the German radio reported that “today the
German Bundestag will decide the fate of Greece.”80
Instead of making decisions regarding the steps neces-
sary to resolve the crisis jointly through the European
Council or the European Parliament, the Bundestag
has emerged as the primary check on democratic will-
formation in Eurozone as a whole. This change has been
driven by the Federal Republic’s Constitutional Court,
which has used its powers of constitutional review to
ensure that crisis measures negotiated between European
leaders have to be voted on by the German Parliament. As
a result, it has turned itself into the de facto legal arbiter for
all of Europe. Much like the Bundestag, the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht has exercised its power over all of the member-
states, despite only representing German interests.
These developments have exacerbated Europe’s demo-
cratic deﬁcit. Much of the EU’s basic structure, such as its
unelected executive commission, which is only partially
responsible to an assembly of representatives from the
nation-states, has existed since its inception in the 1950s.81
Despite these problems, the EU has actually become more
democratic over the course of its development, even in
terms of popular sovereignty. The institutional deepening
of integration since 1985 has accorded more and more
power to the European Parliament. Since the inauguration
of the European Council in 1974, the EU has also been
able to draw more democratic legitimacy from leaders
elected on the national level, because most important
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decisions have to be approved by heads of government
with a domestic electoral mandate.82
There are limits, however, to how far integration can
go without developing its own freestanding democratic
legitimacy through shared supranational practices of
opinion- and will-formation. While many of the EU’s
activities are technocratic and delegated even at the
national level, this defense of the EU has lost its force as
the Eurozone crisis has pushed Europe to expand its
competencies into more democratically salient policy areas
like ﬁscal policy.83 The EU’s increasing tendency to act as
a political union must also be complemented by more
democratic decision-making procedures.
Although important European leaders—represented by
constellations such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer,
and Jean Monnet, who spurred the creation of the ﬁrst
European Communities, as well as François Mitterand,
Helmut Kohl, and JacquesDelors, who undertook Europe’s
transition from Community to Union—answered the call
for further integration in the previous century, leadership
will not be able to resolve the problems of the EMU on its
own. Far from pointing the way into the future, “politics
seems to be holding its breath and dodging the key issues at
the threshold leading from the economic to the political
uniﬁcation of Europe.” Since the EU has failed to deliver on
its promises of prosperity, Europeans have “let themselves
be bothered only by problems that emerge in day-to-day
affairs” with an increasingly nationalist focus.84
Despite Germany’s hegemonic position, the answer to
the question of rule should center on the citizens of Europe.
The crisis has shattered the myth of the EU as a techno-
cratic organization that has little effect on the daily lives of
its citizens.85 Given its increasing inﬂuence on the welfare
and ﬁscal policies of the member-states, it is now clear that
the EU is immensely political and has huge effects on the
everyday lives of Europeans.
One result of the new supranational powers the EU
has developed over the course of the crisis is that the
peoples of Europe are increasingly “address[ing] the same
critically ﬁltered issues and contributions at the same
time.”86 While national media still dominate, in this
nascent transnational public sphere “European issues are
debated as questions of common concern using similar
frames of reference.”87 This, at least, is a positive
development pointing to the potential empowerment of
the citizens of Europe.
It is still unclear whether the rise of a more uniﬁed
European public sphere will engender the social solidarity
necessary to promote ﬁscal policy across borders or
whether it can shift continental processes of will-formation
from national leaders to the directly-elected European
Parliament with an EU-wide mandate. The citizens of
Greece and Italy have already asserted their will against the
desires of the European Council and ﬁnancial markets
by toppling the technocratic governments of Lucas
Papademos and Mario Monti. Despite the difﬁculties,
the citizens of Europe must maintain the belief that they
can embrace their necessary role as the actors who should
be exercising sovereignty over the EU.88
The prospect of further integration also raises the
question of a two- or even multi-speed Europe. On the
one hand, such a move would merely reinforce existing
trends. From its origins, different member-states have
pursued different goals, ranging from cooperation in
market liberalization for the United Kingdom to a genu-
ine desire for “ever closer Union” within the Franco-
German motor of integration.89 States on the institutional
margins have done so by opting out of certain policies,
most notably Schengen and the euro, treating integration
as a buffet from which they can pick and choose, rather
than as a prix ﬁxemenu. On the other hand, transforming
the EMU into an optimum currency area would require
a more formal acknowledgement of this trend, which
would have important psychological and political con-
sequences for relationships between the core and the
periphery. This fact merely reinforces the need for citizen
participation in such a transformation.90
Beyond Economic Rationality
A politically active European citizenry that uses its
popular sovereignty to assert its will through the supra-
national institutions of the EU is crucial for the future of
Europe. The struggles of states to respond to the ﬁnancial
crisis, which was driven in large part by a regulatory race
to the bottom, demonstrates the need for supranational
cooperation on the level of economic, ﬁnancial, and
banking policy. It is now clear that “the democratic states
of the capitalist world have not one sovereign, but two:
their people, below, and the international ‘markets’
above.”91
Despite the successes of the voters in Italy and Greece
in overthrowing the technocratic leaders imposed on
them by external forces, they have not been able to ﬁght
off the neo- and ordo-liberal policy prescriptions dictated
by global ﬁnancial markets and the leadership of the
Federal Republic of Germany. This fact reveals the ﬂaw
in the “back to the state” arguments presented by scholars
like Streeck.92 In order reassert its power in an age of ever-
increasing globalization, the popular sovereignty of the
people will have to move above the nation-state. As
Habermas points out, “it is only through such new
transnational steering capabilities that the social forces of
nature that have been unleashed at the transnational level
—i.e., the systemic constraints that operate without
hindrance across national borders, today especially those
of the global banking sector—can also be tamed.”93
Through an immanent critique of the Eurozone crisis,
I have shown that the developmental pressure of the
common currency is gradually pushing the EU towards
completing the EMU through increasing banking, ﬁscal,
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and political uniﬁcation. The debates spurred by the crisis
have also led to the creation of a nascent European public
sphere, which could potentially create the processes of
opinion- and will-formation within civil society needed to
support these increased supranational political capacities.
As a result, there is reason to hope that “expanding
Europe’s political capacity for action”may in fact “happen
simultaneously with the expansion of the basis of legiti-
mation of European institutions.”94
This argument should not be seen as panglossian. It is
up to the citizens to assert their will against the forces of
globalized ﬁnancial capital. Unfortunately, even before
their recent loss of steering capacity, European nation-
states showed little interest in taming international
ﬁnancial markets.95 This process will be even harder if
the divisions between creditor and debtor states persist. In
that case the status quo inclinations of the German
electorate could cancel out the will of more progressive
voters in the European periphery.
Faced with an economic system that threatens to
overwhelm the political steering capacities of individual
states, European citizens will have to “push for further
political integration in order to extend their control over
quasi-natural economic forces [to] recover a democratic
balance between politics and the market.” To do otherwise
merely perpetuates “a ﬁction of sovereignty . . . convenient
for Germany.”96 While Germans may see themselves as
Hegelian “knights of virtue” (Ritter der Tugend) trying to
hold the other members of the Eurozone to their legal
commitments and the moral imperatives against debt, they
are actually ignoring the fact that their “current practices
are practically self-defeating for the system as a whole.”97
Whether the German voters will come around to this
perspective is an open question. It is possible that a thicker
European society built on an integrated continental
public sphere could succeed in turning existing centrif-
ugal forces into centripetal pressures that “promot[e]
a European identity across social class groups.”98 However,
this would require the citizens of the northern member-
states, who have managed to ride out the crisis so far, to
express greater solidarity for the economic and social
suffering recent events have caused individuals in the
south.
As Europeans come into ever-greater contact with each
other—in large part due to the creation of the Common
Market—there is reason for hope. However, this conclu-
sion also points to the fact that focusing on economic
rationality will not be enough. At the tail end of the Great
Depression in 1937, Horkheimer argued that “the econ-
omy is the ﬁrst cause of wretchedness, and critique,
theoretical and practical, must address itself primarily to
it.”99
As signaled by his use of the word primarily,
Horkheimer was aware that economic critique alone
was no longer sufﬁcient to expose the inconsistencies
within modern industrialized political communities.
Other factors besides economics, including culture,
society, and education, will also be crucial to the
development a solidaristic European public capable of
legitimating the EU with its communicatively-generated
popular sovereignty. Europeans must resist the tempta-
tion to resign themselves to a tragic fate by building on
the opportunities presented by the crisis to not only
self-consciously appropriate and act on the principles
contained within the Eurozone, but also to form the
closer cultural, social, and economic bonds necessary for
them to retake control of their lives vis-à-vis international
markets.100
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